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The objective of this paper is twofold. First, to compare the model of financial 
stabilization in the interwar period in France (a country in the “core”) with that in 
Bulgaria (a peripheral country). Second, applying modern econometric techniques 
(VAR models) we would like to “test “whether the theory designating a dominant role 
of the exchange rate on inflation (in comparison to that of money in circulation) holds 
and can be empirically proved by the actual movement of the monetary variables and 
the direction of their causality. Going back to the history of stabilization in France and 
Bulgaria in the interwar period and studying it through the theoretical ideas at the 
beginning of the XX century would provide us not only with new elements in the 
analysis of the present-day problems of monetary stabilizations but also add to the 
arguments of the crucial significance of the exchange rate and monetary rules for the 




JEL classification: B3, C5, N1 




                                                 
* University of National and World Econom y and ICER; e-mail: nenovsky.n@bnbank.org.  
**“St. Kliment Ohridsky” Sofia University, Bulgarian National Bank; e-mail: 
dimitrova.ka@bnbank.org.  This version of the paper was prepared during the stay of Nikolay 
Nenovsky at ICER, Torino.  Earlier version was presented for the first annual conference of the South-
East Europe Monetary History Network (SEEMHN) on “Monetary and Fiscal Policies in South East 
Europe: Historical and Comparative Perspectives” held on 13-14 of April 2006 in Sofia. The 
discussions and comments with researchers were very fruitful and helpful for completing the study. 
Among them we have to mention Enrico Colombatto, Bertrand Blancheton, Henri Bourguina, 
Dominique Torre, Alain Raybaut, Philippe Saucier, Cécile Hagnauer, Michel Lelart, Martin Ivanov, 
Roumen Avramov, Daniel Vachkov, Atanas Leonidov, Darina Koleva, Yuri Golland, Vladimir Mau 
and Sophia Lazaretou.  
   2
I.  Introduction  
 
The collapse of the communist regime at the end of the XX century in the 
Eastern European countries raised the question of financial stabilization in the region. 
Looking back in history, we find out similar attempts for financial stabilization 
throughout the whole of Europe after the consequences of the First World War (the 
Great War). In fact most European countries took radical measures in the 20's to 
restore the monetary and financial stability which characterized the European 
economies under the gold standard.  
Studying the history of monetary regimes provides us with useful insights. First, 
in theoretical aspect it feeds the present-day debate about the “best” monetary regime 
not only with well-forgotten theoretical postulates but also with some empirical facts 
of the past. Second, the development of statistics and econometrics nowadays allows 
us to test various theoretical models ex post. And third, the analysis of economic 
history can provide us with valuable practical information which in one way or 
another could be integrated in the decision-making process of today and tomorrow. 
In this paper, after a brief overview of the theoretical discussions of the 20's 
(section II) we make a comparative analysis of the financial stabilizations in France 
and Bulgaria after the Great War. In section II we test the theory of the dominant role 
of the exchange rate on inflation (Aftalions’ theory) applying modern econometric 
techniques (VAR models and causality tests).  After summarizing the results which 
proved to be in compliance with the analysis of that time, we propose some 
concluding remarks on the factors lying behind some similarities and differences of 
the two stabilization processes.  
   
 
II.  The exchange rate and inflation – a short journey in the theoretical 
debate of the 20's  
 
The theoretical analysis and the empirical observations of the dynamics of 
prices, money in circulation and the exchange rate in several European countries at 
the beginning of the XX century made the distinguished French economist Albert 
Aftalion (1874-1956)
1 doubt the validity of the Quantitative Theory of Money (QTM) 
and Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). Aftalion is not the first to question the 
shortcomings and difficulties of QTM and PPP (Keynes, Hawtrey, Nogaro (1924) 
among others brought into question their validity and usefulness) but he is the first to 
propose a thorough and systematic theory as a prospective and constructive 
alternative. In spite of its eclectic features, Aftalion’s theory is characterized by 
elements of integrity and logical structure.   
In brief, the way of reasoning and exposition of the theory is the following: 
Aftalion starts with observations of the development of the main variables in the 
QTM and PPP in different countries and for different periods (usually quite short 
periods of time). Applying basic statistical techniques (putting aside whether they can 
be interpreted as causality tests), he finds out that both theoretical postulates could 
not be supported by facts and tried to give an explanation by (i) proposing as 
profound as possible arguments for the development of the monetary variables – 
income theory of money - and later on (ii) elaborated the fundamental income theory 
                                                 
1 Albert Aftalion was born in the town of Rousse (Rustchuk). Bibliographical details and more 
information with respect to his theory on exchange rate and money see Nenovsky (2006).   3
by adding the role of expectations to the behaviour of the monetary variables and 
primarily to the exchange rate (the “psychological theory of money and exchange 
rates”). 
Afltalion states that the causality (the cause-consequence chain) in the context 
of QTM and PPP is different for different spans of time and different countries (9 in 
his empirical studies) as the exchange rate has a dominant role in the price setting 
process rather than money in circulation or the money supply. Taking France for 
instance, he estimated that the magnitude of the link (i.e. the synchronized 
movement) between money in circulation and prices was getting weaker – it was still 
very strong in the period 1914-1919, weak in 1919-1920, and almost disappeared 
afterwards. At the same time this weak relation was replaced by another strong 
causality between prices and exchange rate - the devaluation of the franc leading to a 
direct increase in the price level. Moreover, Aftalion noticed that between 1927 and 
1928 the growth of money supply was not accompanied by a rise in inflation
2. The 
development of the same variables was similar in other countries under study, such as 
the eloquent examples Germany and Austria. Therefore, Aftalion argues in favour of 
the “hegemony of the exchange rate” on inflation for the period 1922-1924 (Aftalion, 
1927, p.109).  
In a similar way Aftalion criticizes PPP, which is a logical extension of the 
QTM in the context of international monetary relations. Here we would like to 
remind the reader that according to PPP theoretical postulate the nominal exchange 
rate is determined by the price differential between two countries which is in turn 
determined by the money supply (money in circulation) in each of them. Aftalion 
considers that neither PPP, nor the current account approaches are sufficient to 
explain the behaviour of the exchange rates. On the base of his empirical 
observations, Aftalion rejects the causality relations starting from money in 
circulation through prices to the exchange rate and argues in favour of exactly the 
opposite causality chain, i.e. from the exchange rate to prices. 
The causality chains analyzed in the QTM framework and Aftalion’s theoretical 
propositions can be illustrated by charts 1 and 2, where m is money in circulation,  is 
the price level and  is the exchange rate. In chart 1 the first causality link (arrow) of 
money to prices is defined by the QTM and the second one from prices to the 
exchange rate is the foundation of the PPP.  
 





According the Aftalion’s observations, the French experience can be illustrated 
by the first causality chain in chart 2 while the second one describes more precisely 
the development of indicators in Germany. However, in both countries he finds 
empirical proofs of the “hegemony of the exchange rate” on prices.  
 
Chart 2. Causality chains in Aftalion’s theory  
 
                                                 
2 According to Aftalion, the expected stabilization of the exchange rate causes an increase in the money 
supply (Aftalion, 1927, p.98, 109).    4








   
In a more elaborate version of Aftalion’s theory (Chart 3), he assumes that the 
inflationary expectations and the expected future development of  money supply 
(denoted by e superscript) influence movements of the exchange rate. Moreover, he 
adds a large set  of other macroeconomic and political factors (the situation of the 
public finances, the balance of payment, tax and customs policy, political, 
international and war news, etc) determining the behaviour of the “central” exchange 
rate variable. 
 












Whatever configuration we take, Aftalion summarizes that the exchange rate is 
the major and direct cause of inflation: “the internal devaluation of the currency is 
moving more or less together with the exchange rate; it is a satellite, not the driving 
force of the exchange rate” (Aftalion, 1927, p. 794). Therefore, he concludes that the 
exchange rate has a particular importance as an anchor for stabilizing money. Hence, 
he comes up with the practical proposition that monetary stabilization should start 
from stabilization of the external purchasing power (exchange rate) which 
automatically leads to stabilization of the internal purchasing power(price level). The 
exchange rate sets directly and immediately the expectations of the economic agents, 
that’s why the fight against inflation should start with it and not with money supply. 
This argument has a direct policy implication in making the choice between 
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III.  Stabilization in France and Bulgaria – chronological presentation 
 
The monetary and financial stabilization after the Great War enables us not only 
to see the complexity of the monetary and exchange rate phenomena (economy, 
politics, ideology, diplomacy, nationalism and other aspects) but also to make some 
parallels with today when monetary stabilization is on the agenda both in the centre 
and in the periphery of global economy
 3. In the period under study France was a 
country which could be referred to as being in the centre of the international financial 
system, a winner of the First World War, while Bulgaria was just the opposite – a 
peripheral country where the issue of stabilization is pressing
4. After the Great War, 
Bulgaria was in the camp of the defeated countries and like Germany had to pay 
reparations
5. 
Three steps were outlined by Sergent’s Commmittee appointed in May 1926 to 
coordinate the establishment of the international monetary stabilization: 1) a 
preparatory period in which inflation should be curbed and the exchange rate could be 
fluctuating; 2) de facto stabilization in which the central bank takes the responsibility 
of maintaining the exchange rate at a certain level by buying and selling gold 
according to the golden points, and 3) the final step is when the exchange rate is de 
jure fixed (to the gold) (Hawtrey, 1932, p. 10). Therefore, in spite of the above 
mentioned differences between France and Bulgaria, the stabilization process in both 
countries went through similar phases
6. As a result of the specific implementation of 
the prescribed stabilization phases and the different international financial positions, 
France and Bulgaria are among the countries which managed to maintain their 
currencies stable for a long period of time after the devaluation in Great Britain 
(1931) and in the USA (1933). France gave up the fixed exchange rate in 1936. By 
means of the specific exchange rate control Bulgaria officially withdrew from the 
convertibility rule in 1941.
7  
 
France – Poincare stabilization 
 
The First World War had extremely negative consequences on the public 
finances and the real economies of the European developed countries, hence on the 
stability of money
8. The lack of willingness to reach a compromise among the 
developed countries resulted in chaotic and inconsistent measures which undoubtedly 
                                                 
3See for example Kindleberger (1990, [1984], 1988, [1973, 1986]) and Eichengreen (1997, [1996]). 
4 The definitions of the core and periphery could be diverse; however, we accept the distinction made 
by Barry Eichengreen who states that in the gold standard period (1870–1914) the “core” comprises 
Great Britain, the USA, France and Germany which are creditors while the peripheral countries are 
characterized as debtors. For more on the exchange rate issues in global and historical aspect see. 
Bordo and Frandreau (2001). 
5 Bulgaria entered the War as an adversary of France. The two sides clashed in Macedonia in late 1915 
after Anglo-French forces landed at the Salonika front.  
6 For more on the logical phases of  the entire stabilization process see Aftalion (1938), Vallance (1998, 
[1996], 261) and Rist (1933 [1925]). Rist argues that the monetary stabilization goes hand in hand 
with the stabilization of the public finance as the latter one comprises two components – halting the 
excessive (uncovered) emission of banknotes and balancing the budget. Stabilization is more a question 
of credibility and usually it starts after accumulating enough foreign reserves. (Rist, 1933 [1925], p.8–
10).  
7 See. Ivanov (2005).  
8 On the consequences of the Great War and particularly in France see Sauvy (1984) who estimates that 
for 15 months the country lost income or wealth accumulated for a period of 11 years.    6
postponed the attempts for stabilization
9. After the restoration of the gold standard to 
the pre-war value in Great Britain in April 1925 [stabilization measures were also 
implemented in Austria (1923), Germany (1924), Poland (1924), Switzerland (1924), 
Hungary (1925), Belgium (1925), Canada (1926), Finland (1926), Czechoslovakia 
(1926) and even in Russia (1922) in the context of different ideology], France finally 
found the political will to solve the dilemma of how to conduct stabilization – 
revaluation (deflation) or devaluation
10.  
Here we would like to remind the reader that the stable franc (le franc 
Germinal) dated back to Napoleon’s day, with gold content remaining unchanged 
since 27 March 1803. As a result of the excessive emission of banknotes during the 
Great War (for a comparison, the volume of the banknotes in circulation in 1913 was 
6 billion French francs while in 1919 it had reached 35 billion francs), the price level 
significantly rose and a great number of the new deals in the economy were 
contracted at the new prices. This fact made it very hard and even “immoral” to 
restore the old pre-war exchange rate achieved by deep deflation and money supply 
contraction. As a consequence of WWI, France had a lot of domestic and external 
debts and above all the burden of the short-term debt, the so called “flying debt” 
(dette flottante) which comprised short-term Treasury bills and particularly Defense 
Bonds (bons de défense). In spite of the then widely shared view that it was necessary 
to restore the pre-war exchange rate (one of its main supporters was Baron 
Rotshield), experts and representatives of the main groups of interests gradually 
converged to the opinion that this was impossible and that a new cheaper franc was 
needed. Although the debate on the level of the fixed exchange rate is important (we 
can recall Keynes’s criticism of Churchill on the restoration of the pre-war exchange 
rate of the British Pound
11), in this analysis we are interested only in the fact of fixing 
the exchange rate, the restoration of the currency convertibility and the golden 
backing of the money supply which was suspended on 15 August 1914.  
After several currency crises caused by growing evidence that Germany would 
not pay the expected reparations, and after former president Raymond Poincaré (1860 
– 1934) had become Prime Minister in January 1924, measures towards financial 
stabilization and balancing public finances were undertaken. Shortly afterwards, 
however, Poincaré fell from power, and though the new left – wing government of 
Herriot tried to follow Poincaré’s financial policies in its early days, it lost confidence 
and took France to the brink of financial chaos, near defaults on domestic debt, and a 
currency crisis. In the period from 3 March 1924 to 2 April 1925 the weekly balance 
sheets of the Banc de France were falsified by means of accounting manipulations 
with the purpose of disguising the considerable increase of money in circulation. The 
                                                 
9 Each country blamed its partners in egoism and harsh pursuit of it own interests. For instance France 
did not like to make any economic and political concessions to Germany and her allies because she 
heavily relied on the reparations from the defeated countries. On the role of the consequences of the 
reparations see two points of view exposed by Keynes (1920 [2002]) and Bainville (1920 [2002]).  
10 Rueff endows this dilemma, personified within Poincaré’s life, with 'the resonance of an antique 
drama where the heart (in favor of restoring the old rate) struggles with reason (in favor of devaluation 
due to the irreversible wartime rise in prices),' Vallance (1998, [1996], p. 250). At the time in most 
developed countries and particularly in France, there is “pathological adherence to the monetary 
stability and to the orthodox points of view” (Kemp   (1971,  82). Keynes analyses in details the 
“deflation-devaluation” dilemma reducing it to the choice between price and exchange rate 
stabilization (Keynes, 1923).  
11 Keynes argued in favour of the level of the stabilized exchange rate of the franc which was the 
opposite to the British decision (see the collection of his articles and pamphlets on the franc by Keynes, 
1928).     7
violation of the ceiling of 41 billion francs fixed by law became obvious on 2 October 
1924. Under the pressure imposed by the consultants of the Banc de France, the truth 
was revealed on 9 April 1925, immediately demolishing the credibility in the franc, 
breaking expectations and increasing the probability of currency and financial crisis, 
and Herriot’s government lost power
12. 
Poincaré won the elections again in July 1926, forming a broad coalition 
(including Herriot himself) and immediately launched radical reforms with the aim of 
“paying the bill for the war” and of stabilizing the franc. An expert group, in which 
Jacques Rueff was in charge of a “special mission” (chargé de mission)
13 to find the 
“optimal exchange rate of the franc”, was established to discuss the technical details 
of stabilization. As a result of the constructive reforms in the public finances 
(balancing the budget), mainly cutting the expenditures, increasing taxes and 
converting the short-term debt into a long-term debt, the expectations of stabilization 
grew stronger. This process was accompanied by capital inflows leading to the 
accumulation of foreign reserves at the Banc de France and to the restoration of the 
demand of national currency (in real terms). 
 
Figure 1. France (1920–1926): Price level, money in circulation and exchange rate 
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In August 1926 a new ceiling on the money in circulation was re-introduced and 
in February 1927 the emission of  Treasury bonds ceased. The franc started to be 
appreciated in nominal terms with respect to other currencies, which favoured the 
next step of de facto stabilization. Bank de France began to intervene on the exchange 
rate market in order to reduce the volatility of the exchange rate (as in some periods 
of time it protected the franc from sharp appreciation). Further steps implied abolition 
of the restriction on capital outflows (10 of January 1928) and enactment of the Law 
on the Devaluation of the franc setting the franc at around 80% of its pre-war value. 
At that phase of stabilization the central bank held a significant amount of gold 
                                                 
12 For more details on the falsifications of the balance sheets of the Banc de France see Senegas (2000), 
Blancheton (2001), and also Jacob (1996). 
13 Rueff put his experience of franc stabilization to use in the 1958 franc stabilization which he led 
under the auspices of president de Gaulle. Jacques Rueff conducted League of Nations’ financial 
missions in Bulgaria, Greece, and Portugal between 1927 and 1930.   8
reserves (from June 1928 to December 1932 the foreign reserves increased to 55 
billion francs, i.e. from 8% to 27% of the world gold reserves – see Mouré, 1996, p. 
137–138) which enabled de facto stabilization. A contribution to this was that 
accounting gains from gold revaluation were used for an ultimate strengthening of the 
central bank balance sheet (at the new rate, 1700 tonnes of gold led to a rise of 
Banque de France foreign reserves from 5.6 billion to 26 billion francs).  
Subsequently, after the British and US devaluations of 1931 and 1933, France 
remained isolated in the so – called Gold Bloc. Ultimately, when even Gold Bloc 
members (Belgium, Switzerland) devalued their currencies one after the other, France 
was forced to cede the Poincaré franc on 26 September 1936 under the left – wing 
Léon Blum government. The gold franc thus survived some seven years, making 
France the nation at the centre of the financial system to have sustained monetary 
stabilization the longest. We may state that the Poincaré stabilization was a clear 
illustration of the role of the fixed exchange rate
14, while convertibility and the 
discipline of public finances were a classical example of how to build confidence in a 
national currency. 
 
Bulgaria – the Stabilization of the Lev 
 
The Bulgarian stabilization followed the logic of the stabilization in the 
developed countries with the peculiarities of the peripheral and less developed 
countries.
15 The economic and financial losses of the First World War for Bulgaria 
piled up over the losses born from the exhausting Balkan Wars of  1912–1913 (the 
three wars are commonly referred to as the “Big War”). According to Kiril Nedelchev 
(Nedelchev, 1940, p. 76–77) while daily expenditures for conducting the Balkan 
Wars were about 1 mill levs, during WWI they reached 2 mill levs. According to the 
same author, and not bearing in mind territorial losses, overall Bulgarian spending for 
the WWI may be rounded off at 3 bill gold leva. Public finance was entirely upset as 
for the period 1916–1918 the budget deficit was about 1.5 bill gold levs and the 
central bank (Bulgarian National bank – BNB) financed almost all war expenditures 
of the government (Ivanov 1929, p. 139). As a result, the banknotes in circulation 
increased drastically (around 14 times) and the coverage fell down to 3.2 % of the 
gold banknotes and to 5.9 % of the silver ones (Table 1). The public debt and 
particularly the “flying debt” reached perilous amounts (Figure 2).  
 
 
Table 1. Coverage of the banknotes in circulation in Bulgaria (1912–1918) 
 




















1912  139.6  51.1  36.6  24.7  16.8  58.0 
                                                 
14 Kenneth Moure (Moure, 1996) argues that in the context of the discussions on the technical details of 
Poincare’s stabilization the reader can notice critical remarks with reference to the QTM and PPP, with 
reference to the equilibrium exchange rate as well (hence the terms “depreciation” and “appreciation” 
of the exchange rate are scantly mentioned), and the significance of Aftalion’s psychological theory of 
the exchange rate and its popularity.  
15 On the functioning of the gold standard and its features in the core and periphery of the world 
economy in the pre-war times see Whale (1937) and in the inter-war period  Simmons (1996).     9
1913  166.0  55.3  33.3  22.8  23.4  102.6 
1914  198.9  55.1  27.7  27.7  28.5  102.9 
1915  304.8  61.4  20.1  65.1  22.5  34.6 
1916  577.1  68.2  11.8  256.8  17.2  6.7 
1917  1 176.0  62.9  5.3  316.8  16.9  5.3 
1918  1 969.4  64.0  3.2  329.2  19.4  5.9 
 
Source  and  notes:  Nedelchev,  K. (1940) “ Monetary Issues: Bulgaria, 1879-1940”,  p. 77. 
Studying the data we have found out that calculating gold and silver coverage of the banknotes in 
circulation, Nedelchev used the maximum volume of banknotes in circulation reached in the year and 
the gold and silver reserves at 31 December of the respective year.     
 
 

















Domestic Public Debt Banknotes in circulation
 
 
Source and note: Nedelchev, K. (1940) “Monetary Issues: Bulgaria 1879-1940”, p. 81. “The 
stock of the outstanding domestic public debt in 1922 and 1993 includes also Treasury Bonds 
amounting respectively at 150 mill levs and 300 mill levs. “ 
 
Between the close of 1918 and the end of 1922, even before reparation 
payments began on 1 October 1923, foreign debt service reached 112 mill gold francs 
or 16.3 per cent of budget spending
 16. Reparations under the 27 November 1919 
Treaty of Neuilly – sur – Seine were added to this debt, coming to 2250 mill gold 
francs at 5 per cent annual interest over 37 years plus occupation expenses 
representing a quarter of the national wealth of the economy. French claims on 
Bulgaria were about 26% of overall external Bulgarian debt (next in the creditors’ list 
of Bulgaria was Italy (25%), followed by Greece (12.7%) and Romania (10.55%). 
The external debt was 96% of the public debt as the reparations represented 9/10 of 
the whole external debt (Koszul (1932, p. 40). In spite of its difficult situation, 
Bulgaria made immense efforts to keep a record of “good” debtor who not only bore 
                                                 
16For more on the development of the Bulgarian foreign debt as well as on the overall situation of the 
Bulgarian economy after the Great War see the fundamental and yet unpublished research work on the 
history of the Bulgarian external government debt by Vatchkov, Ivanov and Todorova as well as 
Koszul (1932) and Stoyanov (1933).   10
the debt burden on its own shoulders but also did not obtain any preferential debt 
relief (Ivanov, 2001, 2005).  
The convertibility of the lev was de facto interrupted at the beginning of the 
wars (10 of October 1912) and the unconditional government financing during the 
wars was suspended by the law in January 1919 (BNB, A Collection of Documents, 
Vol. 3, Sofia, 2001, p. 55–56). It was assumed that the break of the convertibility rule 
would be temporary, like some typical short-term interruptions of the gold standard 
during wars or other extreme events (“rule with an escape clause”, Bordo and 
Kydland, 1996). As a result the lev was devaluated 16.4 times for the period 1915 – 
1918 (Toshev, 1928, p. 116, p. 172) and respectively 26.65 times over an extended 
period of years (1912-1923).  
As prescribed by the international financial experts the phases of the Bulgarian 
stabilization were also three and had the following chronology.
17 The first preparatory 
phase started in 1922 with the introduction of the Law on limiting banknote 
emissions (at a ceiling of around 5.5 bill levs). A later amendment of the law required 
that the banknotes in circulation and the other permanent liabilities of BNB should 
not exceed double the value of available gold and other stable currencies on the assets 
side of bank balance sheet. 
Measures to constrain the public finances were also taken by limiting the 
advance credits extended to the government by the BNB to the amount of 4700 mill 
levs (up to 5400 mill levs in special cases). However, under harder budget constraints 
and heavy debt burden (annual payments amounted to around 132.5 mill gold francs 
or more than 50% of the annual budget revenues (Koszul, 1932, p. 48–49)), financing 
the government by banknote emissions was a crucial issue. Therefore, the state of the 
public finances had a considerable impact on the development of the exchange rate 
and prices. 
The expectations of each round of debt negotiations strongly influenced 
exchange rate dynamics. The lowest international purchasing power of the Bulgarian 
lev was reached in 1921 (184 levs per US dollar) and in June 1923 a sharp rise to 75 
levs per US dollar was observed which recorded appreciation of 245 %. The 
following events of the French invasion in Ruhr and its economic and political 
consequences on Germany once again put the international exchange rate system on 
the devaluation path. As a result of the drastic devaluation of the Reichsmark 
Bulgaria (BNB) lost considerable amount of money denominated in Reichsmarks 
blocked in German banks.
18 These assets were accounted in the coverage of the 
Bulgarian levs and their devaluation brought a heavy blow to the purchasing power of 
the Bulgarian lev. This forced BNB once again to introduce monopoly of foreign 
exchange trade (the first exchange rate monopoly was established in December 1918 
and abolished in May 1920). The foreign exchange market was closed (11 of 
December 1923) and BNB started to determine the buying and selling rates for 
foreign currencies. According to the law dating back to 2 May 1924 BNB 
commenced to manage the exchange rate (in the corridor of selling rate of 139 and 
buying rate of 137.2 levs per US Dollar), which is interpreted as the act of the actual 
stabilization (Ivanov, 1929, p. 141).  
The Law on BNB dating back to 20 November 1926 is regarded as the next 
step in the stabilization process of the lev which constituted the convertibility of the 
                                                 
17 For more details see Burilkov (1928), Toshev (1928), Ivanov (1929), Nedelchev (1940), Berov 
(1997). 
18 Bulgaria entered WWI on the condition of getting a loan and financial support from Germany and 
Austria- Hungary of around 200 mill golden Francs.   11
lev, thus enhancing the accomplished transition to the gold-exchange standard. 
According to Article 8 of the Law the coverage ratio of the banknotes was designated 
to 33 1/3 % as it was proposed to target 40%. Although this law defined the coverage 
of the banknotes in circulation, it did not fix the exchange rate to gold, i.e. the gold 
content of the lev was not yet determined.  
 
Figure 3. Bulgaria (1920–1926). Price level, money in circulation and exchange rate 
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With the Stabilization Law (from 3 of December 1928) the lev was finally and 
legally pegged to gold as the exchange rate of “92 Levs per 1 gram of pure gold” was 
laid in Article 1. In further details, accounting also for the BNB commissions the 
exchange rate of 139 levs per US dollar equaled 139 levs per 1 ½  grams of gold 
(which is the gold content of the Dollar). The key role of the stabilization of the lev as 
a ground of the overall financial and economic stabilization is declared by the 
Bulgarian statesmen from its very beginning. On behalf of the central bank, its 
Deputy Governor Burilkov associated the stabilization of the lev with the restoration 
of morality in business relations (Burilkov, 1928, p. 3). 
Loosing foreign currency assets, the stabilization of the lev was accompanied 
by deflationary monetary policy.
19 The money supply contraction was a subject of 
debate and criticism coming mainly from the academic economists – Toshev (1928), 
Yurii (1923), Nikolov (1927), Totev (1932),  Boshnyakov (1936), Chapkunov (1936), 
Sarailiev (1937) and Monchev (1939) among others, who accused it of being at the 
root of the economic crisis in the country.  
    Although the Great Depression exacerbated the economic crisis in the 
country
20, Bulgaria continued to maintain the fixed exchange rate and its 
convertibility, and after the devaluation of the US dollar in 1933 the lev was fixed to 
                                                 
19 In the period after the exchange rate crisis between 1924 and 1927, the money supply drastically 
contracted thanks to the restrictive monetary policy of the BNB - for example Toshev estimates that it 
contracted by around 1/3 (Toshev, 1928, p. 176–177) while prices did not decrease by the same degree. 
According to other authors, in order to reach an equilibrium prices should have decreased more (by 
around 40%) than the degree of money supply contraction (Yurii, 1923, p. 28). 
20 For more details about the influence of the Great Depression on the Bulgarian economy as well as on 
the theoretical discussions of that time see Ivanov (2001, 2005).    12
the French franc (BNB, A Collection of Documents, Vol. 4, Sofia, 2004, p. 419). 
After the devaluation of the franc in 1936, the Governing Council of the BNB 
continued to maintain the fixed exchange rate until the end of 1939, arguing that „we 
are not directly hurt by these devaluations and at the moment there is no need of 
certain adjustment measures and our export will follow its own way” (BNB, A 
Collection of Documents, Vol. 4, Sofia, 2004a, p. 557-562)
21. 
The chronology of the stabilizations in France and Bulgaria shows an 
obvious parallelism of events. The co-movement of the monetary stabilizations is 
predetermined by the decisions taken at the two international conferences in Brussels 
(1920) and particularly in Genoa (1922). Moreover, France (which was our major 
creditor) was in some sense an example (an institutional benchmark) of good 
monetary policy conduct for the Bulgarian politicians and economists and they 
carefully tried to “imitate” it.  As a result France and Bulgaria started almost 
simultaneously the preparations for stabilizing their national currencies in 1924. 
However, due to the fact that the French stabilization (the first Poincare stabilization) 
was interrupted for two years for political reasons and resumed in 1926 when 
Poincare was back in power, the de facto stabilization of the Bulgarian lev was carried 
on before the stabilization of the franc. Later on, the stabilizations in both countries 
reach their “legislative anchoring” together in 1928. 
 
Two different ideological schemes 
 
First of all, it is necessary to point out that most Bulgarian authors studying the 
pre-stabilization period observed empirical discrepancies in the traditional postulates 
of the QTM and PPP (for example Petkof  (1926), Kemilev (1936), Yurii (1923)). 
Going back to the war years 1915–1918, Berov summarized these discrepancies with 
the following empirics: an increase of the money in circulation by 6.2 times, 5.5 times 
increase in prices and only 1.5 times devaluation of the exchange rate to the Swiss 
franc explaining this observation by the strong state intervention in the economy in 
those years (Berov, 1997, p. 71). According to Toshev “the barometer informing us 
when inflation starts to accelerate is the exchange rate” (Toshev, 1928, p. 114–116). 
And many other authors (Koszul, 1932) as well as Bulgarian economists, acquainted 
with the French literature (Ilief, 1930, Petkof, 1926) and analyzing the pre-
stabilization period, shared the opinion that Aftalion’s theoretical framework was the 
most logical one in explaining the failures of the QTM and PPP in the interwar 
period. 
If we use the classic interpretation of stabilization as a credibility effect (or 
confidence effect) and discipline effect
22, we can argue that in contrast to the 
dominating ideology of the stabilization of the franc in France, the role of the 
credibility effect is relatively underestimated in the stabilization of the lev. In other 
words, the Bulgarian economists and politicians underlined that the main motive 
behind the stabilization of the lev is the management of money supply rather than the 
convertibility of money and the credible fixed exchange rate. The few exceptions are 
                                                 
21 According to Monchev (1939, p. 55), there were two tendencies: creditors (among which France) 
wanted to devaluate their own currencies with the purpose to improve their balances of payments while 
debtors (primarily agricultural countries among which Bulgaria) decided on keeping the purchasing 
power of their currency in order to reduce their debts (they often introduced protective tariffs). A 
historical analysis of the reasons why Bulgaria did not devaluate the lev is offered by Ivanov (2005) 
22 Raybaut and Torre (2005) provide an interesting analysis on the credibility and discipline effects.    13
represented only by economists of the BNB
23 who gave an advantage to the 
credibility effect achieved by the stabilization of the lev while at the same time not 
rejecting the importance of the discipline effect. 
Some Bulgarian authors, however, totally neglected the role of the credibility 
effect stemming from the stabilization. For example, Toshev (1928) criticized Adolf 
Wagner’s theory of credibility pointing out that there were objective economic laws, 
otherwise “scientific arbitrariness” would reign (1928, p.99). He states that the 
volume of money is more important than the convertibility rule, “convertibility is an 
empty word” (p. 178) and “the estimation of the gold content of lev is an arbitrary 
act” (p. 199). Like Toshev, Nikolov argues many times that the main question is not 
about the coverage or whether money should be fiat or gold backed but rather about 
its quantity. He states that there is a “harmful psychological preference for gold 
money and not [for] fiat money” (Nikolov, 1927, p. 31–33). In his opinion, “the 
coverage is not equally suited for all times and for all countries” (p. 34). Toshev 
(1932, p. 52) also agrees that the main question is “How much money is necessary for 
market exchange?” and although he mentions the role of credible money (as a second 
factor which influences the value of money together with its volume), he insists that 
“in the process of stabilizing the monetary system, the quantity of money is more 
important than its coverage” (p.105–109). 
Therefore, two different “ideological” schemes of monetary stabilization are 
formed in France (dominating credibility effect) and Bulgaria (prevailing discipline 
effect) which predetermine to some extent (of course, together with other factors) the 
different approaches in the implementation of the stabilization process in the two 
countries
24. While the stabilization in France is more “market-oriented” and based on 
building credibility, the stabilization in Bulgaria is more administrative and regulated 
by the state (foreign currency exchange trade monopoly imposed by the BNB, control 
over the capital flows, etc.),the aim of which is to establish financial discipline. 
In spite of the variety of interpretations, Bulgarian economists concurred in 
underlining the role of the psychological factors and expectations in determining 
exchange rate and price movements. Similar to the influence of the expectations 
about the reparations’ receipts from Germany on the French franc, the value of the lev 
was strongly influenced by the expectations about the outcome of the debt 
negotiations. The franc exchange rate was further influenced by the expected 
introduction of new taxes announced by the left government in July 1926, while the 
lev exchange rate reflected the expected increase of customs tariffs in 1921. 
                                                 
23 BNB economists stressed the role of confidence in the monetary stabilization on many occasions. For 
example in the Annual Report of the BNB from 1929 the analysis of the Bulgarian economic situation 
at the beginning of the Great Depression points out that: “The situation of the exchange rate as well as 
the measures undertaken by the management of the Bank have not given any reason of concern with 
respect to the stability of the Lev. Unfortunately, such disturbing rumours have found rich ground in 
our society, constantly worried about some phantasmagorical threat; those rumours went abroad and 
caused a great damage to our financing. The management of the Bank did its best to disperse all 
concerns and doubts and to ensure the public that in spite of the unfavourable economic development 
BNB together with the contribution of other factors is capable to maintain the stability of the Lev” 
(BNB, A Collection of Documents, Vol. 3, Sofia, 2001, p. 55-56).  
24 The different features of the stabilizations comparing Bulgaria to other countries of the “Gold bloc” 
are subject to analysis  by Sarailiev (1937, p. 27) who focuses on the trade-off between “Lev’s 
devaluation and customs’ duties acceleration” and argues in favour of the latter with view to improve 
the external balance of Bulgaria. According to him the first approach is like a “leap in the dark”. In 
Sarailiev’s book the reader can find some of the later arguments of the presence of “original sign” in 
the peripheral countries (p. 32).    14
Moreover, we can draw an obvious parallel between the influence of the capital 
flows on the exchange rate and price development. In France there was a huge capital 
outflow by mid 1926 and after the second Poincare government the capital returned 
back to the country. Similarly there was a capital outflow from Bulgaria in the period 
from June 1923 till April 1924, when high taxation on capital profits was expected 
and quite a reverse tendency after the strong and explicit motivation of the authorities 
for stabilization. If we use Aftalion’s scheme, the set of factors    having impact on 
the exchange rate comprises: 1) the prospective optimistic outcome of the 
negotiations about the reparations, 2) the tendency towards budget balancing, 3) the 
development of the positive trade balance, as well as 4) many other psychological 
factors (mentioned by Chapkunov, 1936, p. 39).  
 
 
IV.  Econometric tests almost a century later 
 
In spite of being regarded as simple from present-day point of view, Aftalion 
applied progressive methods of correlations and standard errors over time series of 
indices of the main variables and pedantically compared their dynamics. Wrongly or 
at least in an oversimplified approach (given modern theories), he interpreted the 
change of variable  coming before the change of variable  as a causality relation. 
Today we know that problems with causality are considerably more complex 
and that even causality in Granger-Sims terms
25.   
Before proceeding with the econometric tests of the psychological theory of 
Aftalion, it is necessary to comment some methodological features. First, the tests 
will be applied from the period starting with the end of the WWI up to stabilization, 
as the stabilization is treated as a reaction to the dominating role of the exchange rate 
in explaining price development as well as in stabilizing inflation expectations. We 
stop at the de facto stabilizations, thus in the case of Bulgaria the last observation is 
for May 1924 and of France it’s for July 1926. This automatically shortens the time 
series under study by almost two years.  
Second, it is important to take into consideration the market “purity” 
characteristics in the period under study, i.e. to what extent the movement of the 
variables is driven by market forces and principles and to what extent the state 
regulates the prices or determines the development of other indicators (regulating the 
deficit by a coupon system or exchange rate controls). The “clearer” the market is, the 
more obvious is the effect of the psychological theory. Undoubtedly, during the war 
years the intrusion of the state in both countries was very strong. As we have already 
mentioned, the Bulgarian stabilization was considerably less market-based than the 
French one, and respectively the period in which we can detect Aftalion’s 
interrelations between the variables is shorter (this could be one of the reasons why 
he has not included Bulgaria in the sample of countries which he studied).  
Third, it is necessary to keep in mind the quality of statistics in both countries, 
for example to what extent the announced price indices reflect the actual movement 
of prices or to what extent the announced money in circulation is close to the true 
one. We would just like to note that as in France (May 1924 – April 1925), there are 
observations of accounting manipulations with the balance sheets of the central bank 
                                                 
25 The variable ? causes ? at a given information set if the current value of  ? could be better forecasted 
by adding past values of ? rather than without them.    15
in Bulgaria
26 with the purpose of disguising the true acceleration of money in 
circulation and the violation of the legislation. For this purpose we provide a detailed 
data description of indicators’ dynamics reflecting data quality characteristics and 
policy influence which will be taken into account in the econometric analysis.    
The econometric estimation of the psychological theory of Aftalion for the pre-
stabilization periods in both countries (France and Bulgaria) shall be reduced to 
several tests of the dynamics of the exchange rate, money in circulation and prices. 
The fist step involves an analysis of the development of the indicators and their basic 
characteristics with a focus on building consistent time-series, variance and 
correlation statistics
27. In order to identify causality chains, in the second step we 
shall apply Granger causality test to each couple of variables. And finally the 
econometric analysis of indicators’ relations and inter-dependency shall be extended 




Econometric test for France (1920–1926) 
 
The pre-stabilization period under study is the same as the one that Aftalion 
studied (1920-1926) and more precisely it ends with July 1926 when it became clear 
that Poincare would undertake the “second” stabilization reform. Therefore we use 
the same data which Aftalion used (Aftalion, 1927, p. 58-64). Here we would like to 
draw the attention of the reader to a very curious methodological case. 
As we have already mentioned the weekly balance sheets of the Bank de 
France were falsified between May 1924 and April 1925 with the purpose of hiding 
the excessive emission of banknotes (this case is studied in details in Blancheton, 
2001). Weekly analysis of the balance sheets reveals that by falsifying its balance 
sheets, the central bank managed to meet the legislative ceiling of 41 bill Francs in 
the fourth week every month till August 1924. The violation of the rule could no 
longer be disguised in the last week of September 1924 and became obvious on the 
2
nd of October. Although the period and volume of falsified data were not 
significantly large (still a symbol of the violation of the rule), we come across a 
methodological case stemming from the fact that Aftalion built his theory on the 
official values of the observed indicators. 
Hence, it would be logical to ask ourselves several questions. First, is it 
appropriate to use the true data when in fact the expectations of agents and their 
decisions were taken on the basis of the falsified data? Second, is it not nevertheless 
right to use the true data which could better explain the fundamental relations in the 
QTM and PPP? Third, would it be proper to reject Aftalion’s theoretical relations on 
the basis of data he did not use? Finally, why did he not (as well as other economists 
such as Rueff for instance (Rueff, 1927, p. 343)) apply the true data when the 
falsification was revealed in April 1925, turning out to be the direct occasion for the 
exchange rate crisis in 1926? The answers to these questions could be a subject of 
                                                 
26 This happens outside the period under study, in the mid 30’s under the governor of the BNB - Dobri 
Bozhilov. Later on the accusations of falsification are addressed to Kiril Gunev - a deputy governor in 
the same period (BNB, A Collection of Documents, Vol. 4, Sofia, 2004b, p. 945-952).   
27 Similar to what Aftalion (1927) and Petkof (1926) did for Bulgaria by  means of “hand” calculations.  
28 The analytical steps are similar to the ones undertaken by Spanos et al.  (1997).   16
another discussion
29. In this study we shall use the same data upon which Aftalion 
built his psychological theory of money and exchange rate.  
The statistical characteristics and above all the variance of variables (either in 
levels and in first difference of logs) show at first sight that the dynamics of the 
exchange rate is the most volatile (0.07), followed by the development of prices 
(0.04) and then by the money in circulation (0.01). Moreover, the correlation matrix 
(tables 2) proves that there is a stronger co-movement between the exchange and the 
prices as well as between the exchange rate and the money in circulation rather than 
between money in circulation and prices. Let’s recall that Aftalion divided the period 
in small samples (up to a year) and he calculated the correlation in each of these sub-
samples. However, we consider that this approach is not very useful and informative,  
last and not least because of the problem of interpreting correlations as causality. 
Therefore, we opt for testing Aftalion’s theory for the whole period. 
 
Table 2. France: Correlation matrixes of variables 
 
In levels  Exchange rate  Money in circulation   Price level 
Exchange rate   1.000000   0.925512   0.874854 
Money in circulation   0.925512   1.000000   0.855251 
Price level    0.874854   0.855251   1.000000 
 
First difference of logs   Exchange rate  Money in circulation   Price level 
Exchange rate  1.000000  0.286006  0.713637 
Money in circulation  0.286006  1.000000  0.332630 
Price level   0.713637  0.332630  1.000000 
 
In the second step in identifying causality relations, we study Ganger causality 
tests in pairs by taking threshold probability of 0.05 as a criterion to reject the null 
hypotheses (Table 3). Thus we can summarize the results and give them the following 
economic interpretation: (1) exchange rate dynamics are more likely to be the 
determinant of money in circulation development than the other way around, (2) 
exchange rate dominates the dynamics of prices and (3) the causality chain between 
prices and money in circulation is not clear-cut. Therefore, the direction of causality 
observed and theoretically postulated by Aftalion and namely that the impulse starts 
from the exchange rate, and later on passes through to prices and to money in 
circulation, is in general confirmed by Granger causality tests. 
 
Table 3. France: Granger causality tests 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Sample: 1920 – V. 1926    
Lags: 4     
          Null Hypothesis:  Obs  F-Statistic  Probability 
          MF does not Granger Cause EF  75   2.08188   0.09308 
  EF does not Granger Cause MF   2.66357   0.04003 
          PF does not Granger Cause EF  75   2.58119   0.04513 
                                                 
29 It is possible to estimate the correlation between the true and the falsified data with the purpose of 
analyzing whether they move together or not. Another suggestion is to put a dummy variable in the 
models.    17
  EF does not Granger Cause PF   4.40683   0.00322 
          PF does not Granger Cause MF  75   4.20828   0.00428 
  MF does not Granger Cause PF   4.22419   0.00418 
         
The results of the data analysis provide us with the necessary information to 
construct a VAR model which includes up to the 4
th optimal lag of variables set 
according to the Akaike and Schwartz information criteria (see in the Appendix). 
Based on the relatively acceptable statistical characteristics of this model we generate 
impulse response simulations and variance decomposition as a next step of the 
econometric analysis. The simulation of impulse responses (Figure 4) “validates” 
Aftalion’s theory of hegemonic exchange rate as prices respond much more to 
exchange rate shock rather than to a shock driven by money in circulation (column 2). 
Moreover, it is apparent that money in circulation has a comparatively weak influence 
on the development of prices and the exchange rate (column 3). 
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Besides, the results of variance decomposition analysis show the role of 
inertia and expectations in the process of price and exchange rate setting. For 
example, the decomposition of price variance suggests that around 62% is explained 
by its own past values, 36% by the exchange rate and only about 1–2 % by money in 
circulation. In a similar way, around 85% of the volatility of the exchange rate is 
automatically induced, 12 % is associated with price development and only up to 3 %  
is a result of the changes in money in circulation. The variance decomposition 
analysis on money in circulation provides us with econometric evidence that 80% of 
it is determined by its own past values, around 11–12 % by price dynamics and about 
8–9% by the behaviour of the exchange rate. 
This final step of the econometric analysis allows us to “confirm” Aftalion’s 
observations and theoretical arguments of the causality chains between these three 
variables and mainly that the dynamics of the exchange rate are the major source of 
shocks to the economy in the interwar period which passes through to prices and dies 
away with the adjustment of the volume of money in circulation. Thus, we can 




Econometric Test for Bulgaria (1920–1924) 
 
For the period under study (1920–1924) we used monthly price data from the 
Statistical Annual Reports of the Kingdom of Bulgaria available from the beginning 
of 1922. In addition we analyzed data collected from the literature and namely the 
time series of price changes of food, heating and electricity for the period 1922–1931 
(Koszul, 1932, base indices 1914=100) and monthly data of “price index” for the 
period 1920-1927  (Nedelchev, 1940, base indices 1913=100), without any indication 
of its content and source of information. Adjusting them to one and the same basis 
(1913=100) and comparing them with the official statistical data starting in 1922, the 
three time-series overlap except for 1924 when Nedelchev’s data is slightly different. 
Thus, the price indicator for Bulgaria is the “index of the price change of food, 
electricity and heating for the 12 major cities in the Kingdom of Bulgaria”, as we 
shall use Nedelchev’s data for the period 1920-1923 and official data for 1924. 
It is even more difficult to find reliable data on the Lev US Dollar exchange rate over 
the period considered. Koszul (1932) uses average monthly data published in the 
Federal Reserve Bulletin starting in 1922. Following the same source of information 
we manage to extend the series no earlier than July 1921 as before this data there are 
only minimum and maximum values. In BNB’s quarterly bulletin (“Izvestia na 
BNB”) there are monthly “average” exchange rate data for an earlier period – up to 
1919 as we observe some differences among the two time-series. As we already 
mentioned when we discussed Bulgarian price data, putting aside the deliberate data 
manipulation (typical for the period before and during stabilization), the differences 
could be due to rounding numbers or lack of qualified statistical staff at the BNB or 
print errors
30. Our aim to cover a period as long as possible imposes limits on using 
BNB data, provided that economic agents in the country take decisions based on the 
official source of information. Interestingly, BNB tends to underestimate nominal 
appreciation and overestimate devaluation of the national currency.  
And finally with respect to the third variable (money in circulation) the 
differences between available data series are minor, regardless of the numerous 
approaches to define this indicator. Given the data availability constraints, we study 
only banknotes in circulation as we have not found monthly statistics of the 
component on the liability side of the BNB balance sheet (demand deposits and 
correspondence accounts) before 1922. Moreover, the official data published by the 
BNB
31 and the data of money in circulation in Koszul (1923) are identical, so we 
have no problems in constructing this historical time series for the period under study. 
We may now turn to testing the statistics following the steps taken in 
analyzing the French pre – stabilization period. The statistical characteristics of 
volatility bring exchange rate movements to the fore, though not as clearly as in the 
French case. The exchange rate records the highest degree of deviation from its mean 
                                                 
30 For instance, the monthly average buying exchange rate for May 1924 is 147.2 and its maximum 
and minimum rates are 137.2 The latter is obviously a printing mistake which is most probably 
the explanation of the resulting buying rate higher than the monthly average selling rate.  
31 Monthly data for banknotes in circulation for the period prior to 1928 were collected and 
generously provided by Martin Ivanov.     19
value (0.11), followed by price (0.04) and money in circulation which ranks last 
(0.02),taking the variables as first difference of logs. 
Interestingly, correlation matrixes and particularly when variables are 
transformed in first difference of logs, suggest a stronger correlation between 
exchange rate and money in circulation (Table 4). It is worth noticing that for 
different sub-samples the correlations vary a lot, which reflects the high dynamics 
and different characteristics of market-setting mechanisms, degree of state 
intervention, etc. For instance shortening the period by eliminating the observations 
before July 1921, produces a closer correlation between exchange rate and priced 
dynamics both in levels and in first difference of logs. 
 
Table 4. Bulgaria: Correlation matrixes of variables 
 
In levels  Exchange rate  Money in circulation   Price level 
Exchange rate   1.000000  0.793905  0.780339  
Money in circulation  0.793905   1.000000  0.691938 
Price level   0.780339  0.691938   1.000000 
 
First difference of logs  Exchange rate  Money in circulation   Price level 
Exchange rate  1.000000  0.141123  0.000123 
Money in circulation  0.141123  1.000000  0.019133 
Price level   0.000123  0.019133  1.000000 
 
Granger causality tests also show some differences from the dynamics of 
French monetary variables. Being more liberal (applying the acceptability/rejection 
criterion at probability of 0.10), we can say that: 1) the exchange rate is obviously the 
cause of price movements, 2) the exchange rate reflects money in circulation 
dynamics as well, and 3) that there is some probability that money in circulation 
influences price changes. What cannot be ruled out, however, is the alternative that 
exchange rate dynamics have a direct impact on prices.  
 
Table 5. Bulgaria: Granger Causality test  
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Sample: 1920–V.1924  
Lags: 2     
          Null Hypothesis:  Obs  F-Statistic  Probability 
          PB does not Granger Cause EB  51   0.43735   0.64840 
  EB does not Granger Cause PB   4.95947   0.01121 
          MB does not Granger Cause EB  51   2.69840   0.07797 
  EB does not Granger Cause MB   2.29515   0.11217 
          MB does not Granger Cause PB  51   2.07661   0.13695 
  PB does not Granger Cause MB   0.07956   0.92365 
         
Despite the comparatively short sample of 53 monthly observations (we have 
79 observations for France), the VAR models provide us with interesting results (see 
Appendix). In the first place, the impulse response analysis gives indications of weak 
influence of money in circulation on the price and exchange rate setting mechanisms 
(column 2 in figure 5). All three variables are primarily determined by themselves, 
implying either high degree of independence (strong inertia) or broken relations due 
to some kind of interference or administrative setting mechanism. What is important   20
in the case of Bulgaria is the relatively stronger response of money in circulation 
(column 1, raw 2) and of prices (column1, raw 1) to an exchange rate shock which 
justifies the hegemony of the exchange rate. However, the IR analysis suggests that 
the volume of money in circulation lies somewhere between the exchange rate and 
prices in the causality framework.   
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The variance decomposition analysis provides us with a quantitative estimate of the 
causality relations between the variables. The results show that 74-75% of the price 
variance is predetermined by its own past values, around 19% by the volatility of the 
exchange rate and around 7%  by the movements of money in circulation 
respectively. The variance decomposition of the exchange rate (raw 1), apart from the 
considerably high degree of self-induced variance (84–85%), is equally influenced 
(by around 8%) by the (expected) performance of the price level and money in 
circulation. The econometric evidence of the variance decomposition of money in 
circulation suggests that the direct impact from the exchange rate is about 25%, 
which in comparison with the 3% inflation impact is more significant. Hence, money 
in circulation is obviously a function of the exchange rate and not the other way 
around. Summarizing, the results suggest that the exchange rate is the second most 
important variable in explaining price and money in circulation movements after their 
strong dependence on their own “past behaviour”. Of course these estimates, apart 
from being conditional on the short sample, could find a reasonable economic 
explanation like the considerable “non-market” setting of the exchange rate prior to 
the stabilization in Bulgaria (the monopolistic interventions on behalf of the BNB in 
the foreign exchange trade) in comparison to the French pre-stabilization period. We 
produce similar results of the causality test and with the VAR models by shortening 
the period up to the end of 1923 when the exchange rate control is de facto introduced 
and the development of the exchange rate starts to reflect to a great extent the 
interference of the central bank.  
Although the exchange rate is the cause of price movements, yet the latter are 
also influenced by the development of money in circulation. This gives certain 
grounds for claiming that exchange rates affect prices in two ways: 1) directly and 2) 
indirectly, through money in circulation as in both cases, this is carried out by means   21
of expectations. Therefore, the causality chains in Bulgaria in the pre-stabilization 









Since Aftalion’s theory and his statistical tests have been “applied” to the 
Bulgarian monetary history by his contemporaries, it is interesting to compare their 
results with the ones generated by the VAR techniques. As a whole, the estimates by 
Koszul (1932) and Petkof (1926) are very similar to ours. According to the former 
author,the curves and correlation analysis of the money in circulation, prices and the 
exchange rate produce a clear-cut outcome: that in the period 1920 – 1924 the 
causality chains  start from the exchange rate (pp. 120-121, pp. 187-191) as with time 
the significance of money in circulation increases. The statistical estimates of Petkof 
are even closer to ours. The author finds that in the whole sample of 1920 (1921) – 
1924 the exchange rate dictates the development of prices and money in circulation, 
as in times of economic upsurge he observes the following causality chain “exchange 
rate - money in circulation – prices” while in times of economic drop there are two 
chains “exchange rate-prices” and “money in circulation-prices” (p.112). In 
conclusion Petkof summarizes that the determinants of prices are two: exchange rate 
and money in circulation (money supply) (pp. 141-148, pp. 361-377). 
It is interesting to notice that according to our tests the causality chains 
described in Bulgaria are similar to the ones which Aftalion identifies in Germany. 
This similarity is not surprising as both countries are defeated in the IWW and it is 
very likely that debt burden and debt related expectations influence the dynamics of 
the variables and give this specific causality relation. In this configuration the 
exchange rate affects prices through two channels: directly and indirectly by means of 
money in circulation. 
 
 
V.  Concluding remarks 
 
The interwar stabilizations have a number of common features with the 
modern concepts dominating the discussions on the effectiveness of monetary 
regimes and particularly in favour of those based on exchange rate stabilization, 
convertibility and on rules in general rather than on discretion. Such monetary 
regimes have the unambiguous advantage of enhancing credibility in the monetary 
authorities and thus to impose discipline. In this paper we do a comparative analysis 
of stabilization in France and Bulgaria. The two approaches to stabilization are the 
logical responses to the specific pre-stabilization dynamics of macroeconomic 
variables which are difficult to explain by the conventional QTM and PPP theories.  
Albert Aftalion is one of the first economists to emphasize the role of the 
psychological factors, expectations and confidence in the analysis of the development 
of inflation, exchange rate and money in circulation. In many aspects his 
psychological theory of money and exchange rate precedes the modern understanding 




p   22
overshooting effects, Random Walk, multiple equilibrium dynamics, self-fulfilling 
prophecy, etc.). Aftalion builds his theory on observations in the pre-stabilization 
experience in several European countries (Bulgaria is not included in his sample of 
empirical illustrations) and application of basic statistical methods (sometimes 
leading to imprecise interpretations of correlations like causality). The present –day 
econometric techniques allow us to run new tests on the validity of Aftalion’s theory 
at that time. Despite the structural differences between France and Bulgaria in the 
pre-stabilization period, as in Bulgaria there was a great degree of administrative 
interference of the government in the monetary activities, Aftalion’s theory proves to 
accommodate the facts as a whole. 
The role of expectation is very significant as the money in circulation is no 
longer the leading indicator for prices and exchange rate development but rather and 
very often it is the final element in the causality chain of monetary relations. In both 
cases (of France and Bulgaria) the exchange rate is in the focus of expectations of 
economic agents. Its de facto and later on de jure stability as well as the convertibility 
of the national currency turns out to be the starting point of the whole process of 
stabilization. The specific characteristics of the stabilization process in both countries 
reflect the different ideological paradigms under which stabilizations were carried 
out. They illustrate the importance of the discipline effect (the control of money in 
circulation) in the debate concerning the stabilization in Bulgaria, and the dominant 
role of the credibility effect which was well shared by all economists and politicians 
involved in the French stabilization. In spite of the differences, stabilization measures 
are taken in response to similar problems and monetary dependences, all of them 
finding expression in the decisive role of exchange rates and expectation.    23
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Appendix
 
VAR Model for France 
 
Vector Autoregression Estimates 
 Date: 08/08/06   Time: 14:06 
 Sample(adjusted): 1920:06 1926:07 
 Included observations: 74 after adjusting endpoints 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
  DLEF  DLPF  DLMF 
DLEF(-1)   0.134482   0.011680   0.018543 
   (0.15956)   (0.09593)   (0.03860) 
  [ 0.84283]  [ 0.12175]  [ 0.48037] 
DLEF(-2)  -0.266052  -0.222034  -0.010792 
   (0.15529)   (0.09336)   (0.03757) 
  [-.71324]  [-2.37816]  [-0.28727] 
DLEF(-3)   0.043869  -0.024333   0.012586 
   (0.15030)   (0.09036)   (0.03636) 
  [ 0.29187]  [-0.26928]  [ 0.34614] 
DLEF(-4)  -0.047258  -0.092423   0.008085 
   (0.14425)   (0.08673)   (0.03490) 
  [-.32761]  [-1.06569]  [ 0.23167] 
DLPF(-1)   0.742948   0.589630   0.127069 
   (0.26025)   (0.15646)   (0.06296) 
  [ 2.85480]  [ 3.76848]  [ 2.01830] 
DLPF(-2)  -0.418530  -0.017684   0.007236 
   (0.28566)   (0.17175)   (0.06911) 
  [-.46511]  [-0.10296]  [ 0.10471] 
DLPF(-3)   0.045958   0.158871  -0.077449 
   (0.29074)   (0.17480)   (0.07033) 
  [ 0.15807]  [ 0.90889]  [-1.10115] 
DLPF(-4)   0.134019   0.012063   0.013832 
   (0.27123)   (0.16307)   (0.06562) 
  [ 0.49412]  [ 0.07398]  [ 0.21080] 
DLMF(-1)   0.458827   0.106168  -0.009510 
   (0.54824)   (0.32961)   (0.13263) 
  [ 0.83692]  [ 0.32210]  [-0.07170] 
DLMF(-2)   0.366661   0.021685   0.124091 
   (0.53723)   (0.32299)   (0.12997) 
  [ 0.68251]  [ 0.06714]  [ 0.95480] 
DLMF(-3)  -0.092247  -0.126553   0.213472 
   (0.52357)   (0.31478)   (0.12666) 
  [-.17619]  [-0.40204]  [ 1.68537] 
DLMF(-4)   0.247051   0.502510  -0.000416 
   (0.52339)   (0.31467)   (0.12662) 
  [ 0.47202]  [ 1.59694]  [-0.00328] 
C   0.009187   0.004769   0.003164 
   (0.00835)   (0.00502)   (0.00202) 
  [ 1.09986]  [ 0.94964]  [ 1.56608] 
 R-squared   0.323921   0.398689   0.234344 
 Adj. R-squared   0.190921   0.280399   0.083723 
 Sum sq. resids   0.232151   0.083914   0.013587 
 S.E. equation   0.061691   0.037090   0.014924 
 F-statistic   2.435508   3.370420   1.555849 
 Log likelihood   108.2825   145.9337   213.2996 
 Akaike AIC  -2.575202  -3.592802  -5.413503 
 Schwarz SC  -2.170434  -3.188034  -5.008735 
 Mean dependent   0.013873   0.005674   0.005169 
 S.D. dependent   0.068584   0.043723   0.015591 
 Determinant Residual Covariance   6.94E-10   
 Log Likelihood (d.f. adjusted)   465.2493   
 Akaike Information Criteria  -11.52025   









VAR Model for Bulgaria 
 
Vector Autoregression Estimates 
 Date: 08/08/06   Time: 14:11 
 Sample(adjusted): 1920:06 1924:05 
 Included observations: 48 after adjusting endpoints 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
  DLEB  DLPB  DLMB 
DLEB(-1)   0.152272   0.045539   0.076154 
   (0.15511)   (0.06360)   (0.03339) 
  [ 0.98172]  [ 0.71605]  [ 2.28052] 
DLEB(-2)  -0.313069   0.109705   0.015853 
   (0.15772)   (0.06467)   (0.03396) 
  [-1.98493]  [ 1.69640]  [ 0.46685] 
DLEB(-3)  -0.191620   0.151034  -0.036271 
   (0.16091)   (0.06598)   (0.03464) 
  [-1.19086]  [ 2.28923]  [-1.04701] 
DLEB(-4)  -0.147989   0.012393   0.029794 
   (0.17155)   (0.07034)   (0.03693) 
  [-0.86265]  [ 0.17619]  [ 0.80669] 
DLMB(-1)   0.320343  -0.252603  -0.021176 
   (0.73011)   (0.29936)   (0.15719) 
  [ 0.43876]  [-0.84381]  [-0.13472] 
DLMB(-2)   1.263009  -0.053182   0.015976 
   (0.69362)   (0.28440)   (0.14933) 
  [ 1.82088]  [-0.18700]  [ 0.10698] 
DLMB(-3)   0.160999  -0.081902  -0.210192 
   (0.71850)   (0.29460)   (0.15469) 
  [ 0.22408]  [-0.27801]  [-1.35881] 
DLMB(-4)   0.963770  -0.470828  -0.292166 
   (0.70101)   (0.28743)   (0.15092) 
  [ 1.37484]  [-1.63808]  [-1.93588] 
DLPB(-1)   0.622371  -0.234208  -0.034306 
   (0.39255)   (0.16095)   (0.08451) 
  [ 1.58547]  [-1.45515]  [-0.40593] 
DLPB(-2)   0.053459   0.089589  -0.092002 
   (0.37463)   (0.15361)   (0.08066) 
  [ 0.14270]  [ 0.58323]  [-1.14068] 
DLPB(-3)   0.272731  -0.000270  -0.058845 
   (0.35342)   (0.14491)   (0.07609) 
  [ 0.77168]  [-0.00187]  [-0.77336] 
DLPB(-4)  -0.259082  -0.207514  -0.068658 
   (0.35277)   (0.14464)   (0.07595) 
  [-0.73442]  [-1.43467]  [-0.90401] 
C   0.008887   0.008602   0.007394 
   (0.01820)   (0.00746)   (0.00392) 
  [ 0.48832]  [ 1.15278]  [ 1.88726] 
 R-squared   0.290444   0.314350   0.309344 
 Adj. R-squared   0.047168   0.079269   0.072548 
 Sum sq. resids   0.425355   0.071509   0.019715 
 S.E. equation   0.110241   0.045201   0.023734 
 F-statistic   1.193887   1.337202   1.306374 
 Log likelihood   45.31574   88.11014   119.0323 
 Akaike AIC  -1.346489  -3.129589  -4.418010 
 Schwarz SC  -0.839706  -2.622806  -3.911227 
 Mean dependent   0.014162   0.008986   0.004814 
 S.D. dependent   0.112936   0.047106   0.024645 
 Determinant Residual Covariance   1.20E-08   
 Log Likelihood (d.f. adjusted)   233.4311   
 Akaike Information Criteria  -8.101296   
 Schwarz Criteria  -6.580945   
 